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Abstract Life-science phenomena are often explained by specifying the mechanisms that 
bring them about. The new mechanistic philosophers have done much to substantiate this 
claim, and to provide us with a better understanding of what mechanisms are and how 
they explain. While there is disagreement among current mechanists on various issues, 
they share a common core position and a seeming commitment to some form of scientific 
realism. But is such a commitment necessary? Is it the best way to go about mechanistic 
explanation? In this paper, we propose an alternative antirealist account that also fits 
explanatory practice in the life sciences. We pay special attention to mechanistic models, 
i.e. scientific models that involve a mechanism, and to the role of coherence 
considerations in building such models. To illustrate our points, we consider the 
mechanism for the action potential. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the mechanistic account of scientific explanation, to explain some 
phenomenon is to describe the mechanism that produces that phenomenon, where a 
mechanism consists of components and their associated activities organized such that 
they produce the phenomenon to be explained (Bechtel and Richardson [2010]; Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen [2005]; Craver [2007]; Glennan [1996], [2002]; Machamer, Darden and 
Craver [2000]). 
  Although not every explanation is mechanistic, mechanistic explanation has 
proved to be especially fit for advancing our understanding of the structure of several 
actual explanations in science—particularly in the life-sciences—and of the properties 
that a good explanation should have. As currently developed, however, the mechanistic 
account seems to have also an important and problematic feature, which has been largely 
ignored in the literature (see McKay Illari and Williamson [2011], for an exception). The 
account appears to be construed so as to presuppose some form of scientific realism. 
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 As noted by Stuart Glennan ([2005], p. 1), mechanistic philosophers share ‘realist 
tendencies,’ which emerge in the development of their proposals about the nature and 
scope of mechanistic explanation. William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen ([2005], pp. 
424-5), for instance, claim that ‘mechanisms are real systems in nature’ and that correct 
mechanistic explanations involve accurate descriptions of mechanisms themselves 
‘operative in nature’. Carl Craver ([2006], p. 370) holds that ‘[t]o distinguish good 
mechanistic explanations from bad, one must distinguish real components from fictional 
posits’. McKay Illari and Williamson ([2011], p. 820) are yet more explicit. They argue 
that mechanistic explanation requires mechanisms to be real and point out that ‘the 
mechanisms literature is implicitly or explicitly committed to mechanisms being real. The 
claim—they go on—is seldom made baldly: perhaps it has seemed too obvious to 
comment on’. Although the claim might be obvious to mechanist philosophers, scientific 
realism is in fact problematic and the case for it is clearly not settled.1 
 Here we are not going to provide any novel argument against scientific realism. 
Our novel contribution is to show that the scientific realism debate is orthogonal to the 
debate over the nature and scope of mechanistic explanation—despite widespread 
presumption to the contrary. Accordingly, our aim is to show that good mechanistic 
explanation can be construed without presupposing scientific realism. Put differently, an 
antirealist version of mechanistic explanation can be developed such that the distinctive 
features of mechanistic explanation are preserved. In pursuing this aim, we share 
Hitchcock’s ([1992], p. 175) hope that ‘divorcing issues in the debate about scientific 
explanation from ‘prejudices’ imported from the orthogonal debate over scientific 
realism’ will facilitate a rapprochement between different accounts of explanation. 
 If the mechanistic account could steer clear from realist commitments while 
retaining its distinctive attractive features, it would be an advantage for those who wish to 
subscribe to it, but do not have realist tendencies. Furthermore, if good mechanistic 
explanations can be construed without presupposing scientific realism, it would be clear 
that the distinctive attractive features of mechanistic explanations do not depend on a 
commitment to scientific realism. Hence, it will be the realist mechanists’ burden to show 
us what exactly their extra-commitments contribute to scientific explanation. 
 The main claims defended in this paper are twofold: First, scientific realism is 
unnecessary for good mechanistic explanation; and hence one can subscribe to the 
mechanistic account of explanation without thereby committing herself to scientific 
realism. Second, there is prima facie reason to think that a mechanistic account with a 
realist bent faces problems that an antirealist mechanist can avoid; hence, there is at least 
                                                
1 There are at least four types of considerations that make scientific realism problematic. 
First, the epistemic status of unobservable aspects of the world, to which scientific 
explanations often appeal, is controversial. Second, arguments from the 
underdetermination of theory by data put pressure on the idea that an explanation should 
be chosen among its rivals based solely on evidence that may be relevant to its truth. 
Third, the history of science suggests that a realist understanding of science is 
implausible. Fourth, some patterns in the history of science give us reason to believe that 
there are, at present unconceived by us, fundamentally distinct, equally promising and 
well-confirmed alternatives to our best contemporary scientific theories (Chakravartty 
[2011] for a recent survey of arguments for and against scientific realism). 
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prima facie reason to think that it is preferable for mechanists to adopt an antirealist 
stance instead of a realist one. Most of this paper will be devoted to the first claim. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines some core, distinctive 
aspects of mechanistic explanation, and highlights important distinctions bearing on the 
explanatory status of mechanistic models. Section 3 explicates the realist stance, which 
seems to be widely presupposed by current mechanisms literature. Section 4 begins by 
introducing the case-study of the mechanism for the neural action potential. This example 
will help us to argue that presupposing realism is unnecessary, as an antirealist stance 
does at least equally well in preserving the core features of the mechanistic account. Our 
argument hinges on the role of modelling procedures, and coherence considerations in the 
process of specifying a mechanism. Section 5 clarifies further the proposal developed in 
the previous section by addressing three outstanding questions for the antirealist 
mechanist. Section 6 provides grounds for the second claim advanced by the paper. It 
argues that the antirealist stance might be preferable because some of the problems that 
the new mechanists face can be avoided more easily from this stance, rather than from the 
realist stance. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some Core Features of Mechanistic Explanation 
According to the mechanistic account, scientific explanation often involves a description 
(or a model) of the mechanism that produces a phenomenon of interest.2 Mechanistic 
explanation involves constructing a model that represents the spatio-temporally organized 
parts of a mechanism and their causal interactions (i.e. the activities of the mechanism) 
such that they enable the mechanism to produce the phenomenon of interest (see Craver 
and Bechtel [2006] for a concise overview). Organelles, cells, hearts, brains, and whole 
organisms are examples of mechanisms studied and modelled in the life sciences. 
Mechanisms studied in the life sciences produce phenomena like blood circulation, the 
action potential, long-term potentiation (LTP) photosynthesis, and protein synthesis. 
 Adequate mechanistic models need not only include information about the parts, 
causal activities, and spatial-temporal organization of the mechanism producing the 
phenomenon of interest. According to Craver ([2006], [2007]), what is required of an 
adequate mechanistic model is that it is representationally accurate and “how-actually.” 
Craver lays out three distinctions, which are useful to assess the explanatory adequacy of 
a given model. He distinguishes between (1) how-possibly and how-actually models, (2) 
sketches and ideally complete models, and (3) merely phenomenal models and genuinely 
explanatory models. 
 The first distinction, introduced in the literature by Machamer, Darden and Craver 
([2000], pp. 21-2), is elaborated by Craver ([2006], [2007]). How-possibly models are 
‘only loosely constrained conjectures about the mechanism that produces the 
explanandum phenomenon’ (Craver [2006], p. 361). Although how-possibly models 
describe organized parts and activities such that they can produce the phenomenon to be 
                                                
2 For present purposes, we assume that models can be physical objects, fictional objects, 
set-theoretic structures, equations, or linguistic descriptions, and that one of the primary 
functions of models is to represent some aspect of the world (Frigg and Hartmann 
[2012]). 
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explained, these are mere posits, which might not pick out any entity or activity in the 
world. In Craver’s words ‘one can have no idea if the conjectured parts exist and, if they 
do, whether they can engage in the activities attributed to them in the model’ (Ibid.). 
How-actually models, instead, ‘describe real components, activities, and organizational 
features of the mechanism that in fact produces the phenomenon’ (Ibid.). How-actually 
models are not ‘loose conjectures.’ Unlike how-possibly models, in providing a how-
actually model, one should believe that the organized parts and causal activities described 
in the model pick out corresponding entities and activities in the world. How-actually 
models are explanatory; how-possibly models are not. 
 Craver ([2006], [2007]) does not spell out how we should determine whether a 
given model is nearer to the how-possibly or how-actually end. We agree with Weiskopf 
([2011]) that, although terminologically it might sound more natural to say that a how-
actually model is just the true or accurate model of its target mechanism, it is plausible 
that the distinction between how-possibly and how-actually models is in fact an epistemic 
one that turns on degrees of evidential support. To begin with, Machamer et al. ([2000], 
p. 21) frame the distinction in epistemic terms, in reference to the intelligibility bestowed 
by a mechanistic explanation upon the phenomenon it purports to explain. Second, 
Craver’s ([2006], [2007]) own reconstruction of case-studies that illustrate the distinction 
between how-possibly and how-actually models is best understood in terms of 
confirmation. For example, Craver’s argument that the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the 
action potential is a how-possibly model relies on the fact that Hodgkin and Huxely ‘had 
no evidence favoring their model over other possible models’ (Craver [2007], p. 115; see 
also Craver [2007], pp. 117ff on how Bertil Hille’s work on the action potential fits this 
characterisation of how-possibly/how-actually models). Accordingly, even if a model is 
in fact a true or accurate representation of its target mechanism, if we lack evidence in its 
favour, then it is a how-possibly model. Third, as argued by Weiskopf ([2011]), if the 
distinction were in terms of truth, then it would make little sense to say that a how-
possibly model can turn out to be a how-actually model. But, in fact, ‘any one of a set of 
how-possibly models might turn out to accurately model the system, so the difference in 
how they are placed along this dimension cannot just be in terms of accuracy. So it seems 
that this is fundamentally an epistemic dimension. It represents something like the degree 
of confirmation of the claim that the model corresponds to the mechanism’ (Ibid., p. 316). 
 While a how-actually model is both well-confirmed by the available evidence and 
the best-confirmed model among the available models of a given explanandum 
phenomenon, how-possibly models are not well-confirmed (but neither disconfirmed). 
Given a set of models of a given phenomenon to be explained, the model that is both 
well-confirmed and the best-confirmed by the evidence available at the time is a how-
actually model. In light of this consideration, and from the way Craver ([2006], [2007]) 
characterizes a how-possibly model in terms of ‘loosely constrained conjecture,’ it 
follows that in providing a how-actually model, one is justified in believing that the 
claims made by the model correspond to how things stand in the world because that is the 
model that is currently best confirmed, above a certain evidential threshold, by the 
available evidence. This distinction is crucial for the argument articulated in this paper, 
and we shall return on it in the next section. 
 Let us consider the second type of distinction, the one between sketches and 
ideally complete models. A sketch “is an incomplete model of a mechanism. It 
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characterizes some parts, activities, and features of the mechanism’s organization, but it 
has gaps” (Craver [2006], p. 360). Instead, ideally complete descriptions of a mechanism 
‘include all of the entities, properties, activities, and organizational features that are 
relevant to every aspect of the phenomenon to be explained. Few if any mechanistic 
models provide ideally complete description of a mechanism’ (Ibid.). 
 The distinction between sketches and ideally complete models turns on two 
dimensions: the model’s detailedness and relevance with respect to the explanandum 
phenomenon displayed by its target system. If a model takes account of more features of 
the system modelled than another, then it is more detailed. If a model takes account of 
more features of the system that are relevant to the aspects of the phenomenon to be 
explained than another, then it is more pertinent. So, given a set of models to account for 
an explanandum phenomenon, the most representationally complete model is the one that 
takes account of more of the features of the system modelled that are relevant to the 
aspects of the phenomenon. 
 The third distinction is between merely phenomenological and genuinely 
explanatory models. Merely phenomenological models provide only descriptions of the 
phenomena to be explained. They are consistent with observations about the system 
modelled, since they are often constructed via ad hoc fitting of the model to the empirical 
data. And they often allow one to make predictions about the system. Hence, 
phenomenological models are descriptively and often predictively adequate. Yet, they do 
not give us genuine explanatory insight, because they do not reveal the causal structure 
underlying the explanandum phenomenon, and, more generally, do not show why the 
dependencies captured by the models are as the models describe them. Ptolemaic models 
of the solar system are prominent examples of merely phenomenological models. 
 Genuinely explanatory models can be distinguished from merely 
phenomenological models on the basis of the control and manipulation they afford, and 
of their ability to answer “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions (Craver [2006], p. 
358). Accordingly, the more a model affords us with possibilities for manipulations and 
control over the target system’s behaviour, and the more it allows us to answer 
counterfactual questions, the more it is genuinely explanatory as opposed to merely 
phenomenological. 
 Before concluding this section, we should note another distinction between 
current accounts of mechanistic explanation, viz.: the distinction between the epistemic 
and the ontic sense of explanation (Salmon [1984]). According to the epistemic sense, 
mechanistic explanation is an epistemic activity aimed at increasing understanding of the 
world (Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005]). ‘Thus, since explanation is itself an epistemic 
activity, what figures in it are not the mechanisms in the world, but representations of 
them’ (Ibid, p. 425). According to the ontic sense, mechanistic explanation consists in a 
portion of the world producing the explanandum phenomenon. It is the mechanism itself, 
instead of some representation of the mechanism, that does the explaining independent of 
scientists’ epistemic goals, interests, and abilities at identification (Craver [2007]). It 
might be expected that mechanists’ realist presuppositions depend on the sense of 
explanation to which they subscribe. For it seems more natural for the ontic mechanistic 
account of explanation than for the epistemic account to be developed against a realist 
background. However, this is not the case. 
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 Current mechanistic accounts of explanation, in either the epistemic or the ontic 
sense, equally share realist presuppositions. The realist background of mechanistic 
explanation is perhaps clearer on the ontic view, since for mechanisms themselves to 
explain they must be real entities in the world that actually produce the phenomena they 
explain. But even on the epistemic view championed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen, a 
realist stance is explicitly maintained: good mechanistic explanations provide 
descriptions of ‘real systems in nature’ (Becthel and Abrahamsen [2005], pp. 424-5). As 
McKay Illari and Williamson ([2011], p. 820) argue: ‘If the epistemic sense of 
explanation is to succeed in increasing understanding of the world, rather than merely 
making up interesting stories about it, the stories had better be describing the mechanisms 
in the world’. According to this view, explanatory power is a feature of a model (or some 
other representation); and a model has this feature only if it has the “right” relationship to 
the world (e.g. the model is true, correct, accurate, or isomorphic to worldly facts). 
 In sum, in spite of two distinct senses of mechanistic explanation, viz. the 
epistemic and the ontic sense, the shared core of the mechanistic position can be 
summarized in light of the distinctions laid out above. Mechanistic explanation involves 
the description (or a model) of the mechanism producing the explanandum phenomenon. 
A mechanism is a set of entities (i.e. the component parts of the mechanism) and their 
associated causal activities spatio-temporally organized in such a way as to produce the 
explanandum phenomenon. How-possibly and merely phenomenological models are not 
genuinely explanatory. A model is genuinely explanatory to the extent that: 
- it describes ‘real components, activities, and organizational features of the mechanism 
that in fact produces the phenomenon’ (Craver [2007], p. 112). That is, to the extent that 
it is a how-actually model. 
- The model is representationally complete in that it is detailed and relevant to the 
explanandum phenomenon displayed by its target system. 
- The model affords several possibilities for manipulation and control over the behaviour 
of the target system, and it answers several counterfactual questions about the behaviour 
of the target system. 
 With these claims in the background, the next section will specify in what consists 
the seeming realist presuppositions of current accounts of mechanistic explanation. 
 
 
3. Scientific Realism and Mechanistic Explanation 
At the core of scientific realism there is an optimistic epistemic attitude towards the 
outputs of scientific investigation (e.g. Chakravartty [2011]; Psillos [1999]). According to 
this epistemic attitude, our best scientific explanations, theories and models are (at least 
approximately and/or probably) true descriptions of how things stand in the world, and 
we can know them to be so. Scientific realism holds that we are justified in believing that 
the claims made by our best scientific explanations, theories and models about those parts 
of the world that are extremely small, remote in space or time, or otherwise inaccessible 
are literally (or at least approximately and/or probably) true. The core epistemic attitude 
underlying scientific realism can involve a metaphysical thesis, and a semantic thesis. 
The metaphysical thesis is that the world has a mind-independent natural-kind structure; 
when engaging in scientific investigation we discover features of the world that exist 
independently of any observer. The semantic thesis is that our best scientific theories give 
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us literal descriptions of their intended domain and that theoretical assertions have truth 
values. 
 The realist presuppositions of mechanist philosophers include epistemic as well as 
metaphysical claims directed at both the components and the causal activities of which 
mechanisms consist. At the metaphysical level, mechanists have claimed that the 
components and activities, of which mechanisms consist, are mind-independent features 
of the world (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005], pp. 423-5; Glennan [2011], p. 12; 
Machamer, Darden and Craver [2000], Section 3). At the epistemic level, mechanists 
have claimed that we can have epistemic access to mechanisms. In particular, we are 
justified in believing that the descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts and activities of 
the mechanisms involved in mechanistic explanations are literally (or at least 
approximately and/or probably) true (e.g. Bechtel [2008], Section 1.5; Glennan [2005], p. 
19; Machamer, Darden and Craver [2000], Section 7). According to the optimistic 
epistemic stance that is shared by current mechanists, adequate mechanistic explanations 
yield knowledge of all the aspects of the world that they describe. This kind of epistemic 
stance, along with the claim that mechanistic models are explanatory only if they are 
how-actually models, describing real mechanistic components and activities in the world, 
implies that we are justified in believing the claims made by mechanistic explanations to 
be literally (or at least approximately and/or probably) true (cf. Craver [2007], Chapter 4; 
Glennan [1996], p. 52).3 
 We shall be mostly concerned with this optimistic epistemic stance. We put 
forward an antirealist4 variant of mechanistic explanation, which shows that mechanistic 
explanation can do without a commitment to scientific realism while still fitting scientific 
practice. The antirealism we advocate denies two claims. First, it denies that adequate 
mechanistic explanations need be (at least approximately and/or probably) true 
descriptions of mechanisms in nature. This is because the notion of a how-actually 
model, which—as we saw in the previous section—provides a necessary condition on the 
adequacy of a given mechanistic explanation, is most plausibly understood epistemically 
as a model that is best confirmed, above a certain threshold, by the available evidence. 
From this notion, however, it does not follow that how-actually models should be 
regarded as true descriptions. To the extent that mechanistic explanations involve how-
actually models of the explananda phenomena, they need not be true descriptions of 
pieces of the world. 
                                                
3 This conclusion is underwritten by claims in the mechanism literature such as: ‘How-
possibly models […] are not adequate explanations. In saying this, I am saying not 
merely that the description must be true (or true enough) but further, that the model must 
correctly characterize the details of the mechanism [producing the explanandum-
phenomenon]’ (Craver [2006], p. 361). ‘Descriptions of mechanisms are good 
descriptions insofar as they describe what is “really” there’ (Glennan [1996], p. 52). 
4 One referee suggested that our position could be best labelled “non-realist” rather than 
“antirealist” to emphasise that it does not presuppose scientific realism as all the existing 
accounts of mechanistic explanation do. However, we prefer to use the term “antirealism” 
because, as it will be clearer, we hold not only that mechanistic accounts of explanation 
need not presuppose scientific realism (i.e. a non-realist position), but also that there is 
reason to prefer a mechanistic account with an antirealist bent. 
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 Our second denial is that mechanistic explanations require us to believe all the 
claims they make about nature itself. The first denial is motivated by pragmatic 
considerations: ineliminable aspects of scientific practice suggest that at least some 
mechanistic explanantia can simply be seen ‘as powerful and reliable instruments for 
mediating [our] engagement with a variety of mechanical phenomena’ without also their 
needing to be (approximately and/or probably) true descriptions of nature itself (Stanford 
[2009], p. 388). The second denial is motivated by the sort of epistemic prudence 
endorsed by Stanford ([2006], p. 211): the historical record of scientific inquiry makes it 
likely that even our best-confirmed and pragmatically successful current explanations, 
theories and models will ultimately be found wanting and ‘replaced by more powerful 
conceptual tools offering fundamentally different conceptions of nature that have 
presently not yet even been conceived.’ 
 Informed by such motivations, our antirealist variant of mechanistic explanation 
has two aspects, on which we rely to show that good mechanistic explanation need not 
presuppose realist commitments but only a pragmatist, epistemically prudent attitude. 
The first aspect consists in a certain understanding of the process of modelling a 
mechanism. The second aspect of our proposal focuses on the role of coherence in 
mechanistic modelling. The first aspect is concerned with how mechanisms can be 
established in the course of modelling phenomena, while the second one is concerned 
with the justification of a postulated mechanism. Mechanistic modelling and coherence 
play a prominent role in scientific practice. Hence, our antirealist account will fit at least 
these two prominent features of scientific practice. After having specified our realist 
target, and qualified our own antirealist proposal, it is now time to introduce these two 
basic aspects of our proposal, which will be articulated in Section 4. 
 According to the antirealist position on offer here, mechanistic modelling is 
understood as the process by which a mechanistic model is defined. A mechanistic model 
is a model that describes a target system as a mechanism. The model defines organized 
entities and activities such that its target mechanism displays certain phenomena of 
interest. The model does not require us to believe that all the features of the target system 
it defines are real features of a mechanism existing in nature. Nonetheless, this way of 
understanding modelling does not block us from making useful distinctions of the sort 
made in Section 2. 
 A how-actually model at a given historical time will be the one that is best-
confirmed, above a certain evidential threshold, by the evidence available at that time. A 
genuinely explanatory model will be one that answers several counterfactual questions as 
well as affords opportunities for controlling and manipulating the behaviour of the target 
system. A representationally complete model will be one that is both detailed and 
relevant to its target system. 
 These distinctions, however, are not sufficient to address the issues of (i) under 
which circumstances we should believe that a mechanistic model is a true description of 
some aspect of the world, and (ii) which of the particular claims made by a mechanistic 
model we are most entitled to believe. Even if a model is considerably better confirmed, 
above a certain evidential threshold, by the available evidence than any rival that we have 
considered—being thereby a how-actually model—two questions relevant to address 
issues (i) and (ii) remain. The first question is whether we have reason to believe that 
there are equally well-confirmed alternatives to that model that are presently unconceived 
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by us; the second question is whether for some of the claims made by the model we have 
epistemic access independent of the underlying theory’s own descriptive apparatus (cf. 
Roush [2005]; Stanford [2006]). The fact that we have a how-actually model does not 
justify per se a realist attitude towards the model. 
 Good mechanistic models will serve as reliable instruments for engaging with the 
phenomena displayed by the mechanism without the models being necessarily true or 
without the need to commit ourselves to believe all claims made by the model. This will 
allow us to maintain a relationship of epistemic access towards those features of a target 
mechanism that e.g. can be understood independently of the underlying theory, while 
remaining epistemically agnostic about the truth of at least some of the current how-
actually models, or about the truth of some claims derived from a model about its target. 
The case study in the next section will further clarify the type of modelling involved in 
our antirealist proposal. 
 For now, let us introduce the second aspect of our proposal: coherence-based 
justification. While realists might attempt to justify the success of a proposed mechanistic 
explanation by appealing to the truth of the mechanistic explanans, arguing that the 
description of the mechanism featuring in the explanation picks out certain entities, 
activities, and their properties existing in nature, this avenue is not open to the antirealist. 
The main constraint of antirealist mechanistic modelling is that the model is a reliable 
instrument that allows us to guide our pragmatic engagement with the world, satisfy our 
interests, and achieve our practical ends. This constraint opens the door to two concerns. 
First, on which grounds should a mechanistic explanation be accepted if not on its truth? 
Second, how can it be warranted that mechanistic explanations are improved over time? 
After all, there could be many, mutually inconsistent, mechanistic models that serve our 
interests and practical equally well, and also save the phenomena. These types of 
concerns can be defused pragmatically, and in agreement with many episodes in the 
history of science (cf. Kuhn [1962]), by appealing to coherence considerations, and by 
highlighting that, at least under a plausible explication of this notion, coherence is in 
general not truth-conducive. 
 A mechanistic model is never proposed in isolation, but is always embedded in a 
network of other mechanistic models, explanatory theories, and knowledge about the 
world. A mechanistic model is always embedded in a background belief system. 
Different research programs might incorporate different beliefs in their respective 
background belief system at a given time in history. Within a research program, once 
certain beliefs are provisionally assimilated in the program’s background belief system, 
new beliefs and posits typically cohere with such a background belief system. 
 ‘Coherence’ can be understood here with BonJour’s ([1985], p. 93), intuitively, as 
‘how well a body of belief “hangs together”.’ Following this line of thought we would 
then accept an explanation delivered by a proposed mechanistic model only if it makes a 
given system of beliefs more coherent, or at least only if it does not make it less coherent. 
Coherence considerations play an important role in many examples in the history of 
science,5 and—as shown below—in current practice in cognitive neuroscience, where, for 
                                                
5 Kosso ([1992], Chapter 8) and Thagard ([1992]) emphasise the role of coherence in 
scientific practice as driving force in the development and justification of explanatory 
theoretical systems. They both illustrate this role of coherence with several cases-studies 
 10 
example, an explanation of a certain neural phenomenon at a given level of structural 
description—say at the level of neural systems—is accepted in so far as it is coherent 
with accepted explanations at other levels of organization (cf. Churchland [1986]). 
Drawing on coherence considerations, the extent to which a proposed mechanistic 
explanation is a good one, and constitutes scientific progress will depend on whether it 
coheres well with the best available, accepted background knowledge (Hartmann [2001]). 
 One way to precisely explicate ‘coherence’ quantitatively is within a probabilistic 
framework, where coherence is taken to be “a confidence boosting property” of an 
information set (e.g. a set of beliefs, or a model), and the coherence of a given 
information set exhibits itself in the probabilistic relations that hold between the 
propositions in the set (Bovens and Hartmann [2003]). Remarkably, a number of results 
within this area of research have shown that under certain plausible conditions coherence 
cannot fully succeed in being truth-conducive (Bovens and Hartmann [2003], Chapter 2; 
Olsson [2005]). Coherence considerations could thus guide us in choosing between 
alternative mechanistic explanations within a certain belief system, thereby helping us to 
make progress in science; and yet a high degree of coherence of a belief system will not 
generally secure a high probability of truth. 
 Realists might be happy to concede that coherence plays an important role in 
scientific practice and mechanistic modelling. And yet they may complain that this does 
not underwrite an antirealist attitude towards mechanistic explanation. The problem with 
this complaint is that ‘coherence’ is a vague notion. As we pointed out, one way to make 
it precise is within formal epistemology. But, once ‘coherence’ is made precise in this 
way, the link between coherence and truth becomes problematic. Realists’ rejoinders to 
our proposal will then have to meet three challenges. First, realists will have to provide us 
with a precise characterisation of ‘coherence’; second, they will have to show us that 
coherence is generally truth-conducive, and, therefore, does not obviously underwrite an 
antirealist attitude; third, they will have to construct new arguments that the conditions 
required for coherence to be truth-conducive are generally satisfied in scientific cases. 
 By pursuing coherence-based mechanistic modelling in the process of explaining 
a certain phenomenon from an antirealist stance, it can be demonstrated that 1) the 
distinctive features of the mechanistic account remain unaffected, 2) the resulting 
mechanistic explanation is genuinely explanatory, and 3) a realist stance is an 
unnecessary baggage. The next three sections will establish these points, illustrating them 
with the case of the action potential. 
 
 
4. Antirealist Mechanistic Explanation. The Case of the Action Potential 
We focus on the mechanism for the action potential for two reasons. First, the action 
potential is a fundamental neural mechanism, whose modelling has been of considerable 
importance for the formation of neuroscience as a discipline. Second, this mechanism is 
                                                                                                                                            
form the history of science. More recently, Thagard ([2007]) explores the relationship 
between scientific theories, truth, and coherence, and argues that explanatory coherence 
leads to approximate truth. However, his argument overlooks the impossibility results 
proved by Bovens and Hartmann ([2003], Chapter 2) and Olsson ([2005]) that coherence 
does not lead to higher likelihood of truth. 
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now fairly well-understood and has already been dealt with in current mechanisms 
literature (Bogen [2005]; Craver [2006], [2007]; Machamer et al. [2000]; Weber [2008]). 
We can therefore refer to this literature and build on it. Although we shall refer in passing 
to the well-known Hodgkin-Huxley model, our focus is not the Hodgkin-Huxley model, 
which, as we’ll note, continues to be actively debated among current mechanists. Rather, 
our focus is the action potential mechanism, which we take to be representative of the 
mechanistic literature in general. 
 We begin with some science. Neurons mainly communicate using action 
potentials (or spikes). The action potential is a brief (roughly 1 ms) event, consisting of a 
roughly 100 mV fluctuation in the electrical potential across the cell membrane. In its 
resting state the neuron maintains a potential inside its membrane of about – 70 mV 
relative to that outside the cell (which is conventionally defined to be 0 mV). The cell 
membrane is thus said to be polarized. This polarization depends on the difference in ion 
concentrations inside and outside the cell, predominantly sodium (Na+), potassium (K+), 
calcium (Ca2+) and chloride (Cl-). The flow of ions across the cell membrane is controlled 
by ion channels, which are selectively permeable proteins in the cell membrane. They 
open and close stochastically, letting ions flowing into and out of a cell. Whether a 
channel is open or close depends on the voltage and ion concentration gradients across 
the membrane as well as on a variety of internal and external signals. The process 
whereby the membrane potential becomes more negative is called hyperpolarization. 
Conversely, the process whereby the membrane potential becomes less negative or even 
positive is called depolarization. These two processes depend on the flow of positively 
charged or negatively charged ions into and out of the cell. If the neuron is depolarized 
sufficiently to raise the membrane potential above a certain threshold level (about – 
50mV), a positive feedback process triggers the action potential: the membrane potential 
abruptly shoots upward (to about + 40mV) and then abruptly shoots back downward, 
generally below the resting level. It is noteworthy that the generation of action potentials 
also depends on the recent history of the cell electric activity. It may be impossible to 
evoke another action potential for a few milliseconds after an action potential has been 
generated. This period is called the absolute refractory period, and is largely responsible 
for the unidirectional propagation of the action potential along the axon. For a longer 
interval, known as relative refractory period, which lasts up to tens of milliseconds after 
an action potential, it is more unlikely that the neuron will fire another action potential. 
 In 1963 Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley were awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine ‘for their discoveries concerning the ionic mechanisms involved 
in excitation and inhibition in the peripheral and central portions of the nerve cell 
membrane.’ Their model of the action potential, formulated as a set of nonlinear ordinary 
differential equations, is one of the landmarks in the history of neuroscience. Yet, in 
order to satisfactorily explain the phenomenon described above, Hodgkin and Huxley’s 
model may not suffice. Some mechanist philosophers have argued that one reason why 
this model is not explanatory is that it doesn’t describe ‘how the membrane changes its 
permeability’ (Craver [2006], p. 364, emphasis in original; see also Bogen [2005]). In 
other words, Hodgkin and Huxley’s model provides a description of how action 
potentials are initiated and propagated, but it “embodies no commitments as to the 
mechanisms that change the membrane conductance, allow the ionic currents to flow, and 
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coordinate them so that the action potential has its characteristic shape” (Craver [2006], 
p. 364). Hence, it is not explanatory.6 
 According to Bogen ([2005]) and Craver ([2006]), there are two reasons why 
Hodgkin and Huxley’s model is not explanatory. First, it is incomplete (or ‘sketchy’), as 
it only characterizes a small sub-set of the entities and activities that are relevant to 
explain the action potential. Second, and more importantly, it is a how-possibly model 
instead of a how-actually model, since it is was put forward as a conjecture, uncommitted 
to the existence of the entities and activities that it includes. Sketchy models and how-
possibly models would not adequately explain because they do not show how all the 
relevant components, properties, and activities of a real mechanism produce the 
phenomenon to be explained. ‘At most [the Hodgkin and Huxley’s model] provides a 
‘how-possibly’ sketch of the action potential’ (Craver [2006], p. 366). Hence, it does not 
adequately explain. 
 Hodgkin and Huxley did acknowledge that more needed to be known about the 
biophysical features of ion channels in order to reach firmer conclusions about the 
mechanism of permeability change that they ‘tentatively had in mind when formulating’ 
their model (Hodgkin and Huxley [1952], p. 541). Nonetheless, after more than half a 
century, neuroscientists recognize that, in spite of several limitations, the ‘Hodgkin–
Huxley explanation of the action potential—regenerative depolarization due to a steeply 
voltage-dependent sodium-selective conductance followed by repolarization due to 
inactivation of this conductance along with activation of a slower potassium 
conductance—has been confirmed beyond doubt’ (Bean [2007], p. 462, Box 3). The 
conceptual framework that the Hodgkin–Huxley model put in place is in fact still widely 
used to quantitatively understand how lower-level events such as voltage-dependent 
membrane conductances relate to such macro-level changes as spike generation (Dayan 
and Abbott [2001], Chapter 5). In general, it is not obvious  that a mechanistic model is 
explanatory only in so far as it provides us with a non-gappy and (approximately and/or 
probably) true description of its target mechanism (cf. Bokulich [2011]; Levy 
[forthcoming]). We deny this claim, and by drawing on the case of the action potential, 
we now lay out our antirealist mechanistic proposal.7 
 In order to provide such a mechanistic model, the first step is to clearly identify 
the phenomenon to be explained. Phenomena can be plausibly understood as ‘features of 
the world that in principle could recur under different contexts or conditions’ (Woodward 
[2011], p. 166; see also Bogen and Woodward [1988]). Both realists and antirealists can 
subscribe to this characterization—at least if we do not restrict it in question-begging 
ways.8 The disagreement between realists and antirealists is in fact not about the notion 
of ‘phenomenon,’ but about epistemic commitments. 
                                                
6 Against Craver’s and Bogen’s views, Weber ([2008]) argues that the Hodgkin-Huxley 
model is explanatory, as it successfully identifies causal relations underlying the action 
potential. 
7 The step-by-step reconstruction of mechanistic explanation we articulate should not 
suggest that scientists follow some “recipe” in providing a mechanistic model, nor that, in 
practice, the steps we describe are pursued in an orderly manner. 
8 Phenomena should be distinguished from data. ‘Data are public records produced by 
measurement and experiment that serve as evidence for the existence or features of 
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 One way to identify the explanandum phenomenon is in two steps: First, we posit 
some mechanism producing the phenomenon, treating this mechanism as a black-box at 
this initial stage. Second, we describe the outputs of the posited underlying mechanism. 
These consist of what can be measured, or data, about the phenomenon of interest, given 
available methods and technologies. For instance, some important outputs of the 
mechanism of the action potential are the rate at which the action potential raises, its peak 
magnitude, its subsequent rate of decline, and its refractory period. At least some of the 
measurements of these outputs may only require a pragmatist attitude from us. Besides 
accepting these results, on the grounds that they cohere with the rest of our background 
knowledge, and we can use them to fulfil our pragmatic goals and epistemic interests in 
the course of the modelling of the mechanistic phenomenon, we need not believe in the 
truth of any claim about specific features of the posited mechanism. This step is informed 
by a pragmatic attitude, and respects the epistemic prudence involved in our antirealist 
proposal. Such a pragmatic attitude towards the relationship between at least some of the 
measured outputs of a putative mechanism of interest and specific features of the 
mechanism itself also fits much of current work directed at understanding how the 
generation of action potentials depend on complex lower-level channels’ interactions. For 
example, although the somatic voltage-clamp method is currently one of the most 
widespread approaches to investigate synaptic physiology and neural excitability, this 
method suffers from “space-clamp” limitations,9 which can significantly affect 
measurements of several features of dendritic synapses and ion channels activity (Bar-
Yehuda and Korngreen [2008]; Williams and Mitchell [2008]). 
 It is also important to note that insofar as phenomena are relatively stable and 
general features of the world that are interesting from a scientific point of view, realists 
and antirealists will agree on the identification of the phenomenon. Both realist and 
antirealist mechanist accounts will then fit one core aspect of mechanistic explanation, 
viz. mechanisms produce phenomena. 
 After the explanandum phenomenon has been sufficiently characterized, the 
underlying black-box mechanism needs to be “opened-up.” For the realist mechanist this 
is a process of discovery, called decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson [2010]). 
Decomposition is about taking the mechanism (physically or conceptually) apart with the 
aim of identifying its constitutive parts and the related activities. It involves both 
structural and functional decomposition of the putative mechanism producing the 
phenomenon of interest. Although some parts and operations can be directly observed, 
                                                                                                                                            
phenomena’ (Woodward [2011], p. 166). While data, unlike phenomena, seem to be 
necessarily observable, observability is not crucial to the data/phenomena distinction. In 
Woodward’s words:  ‘in many cases standard discussions of the role of observation in 
science shed little light on how phenomena are detected or on the considerations that 
make data to phenomena reasoning reliable—asking whether phenomena are observable 
is often not the right question to ask if one wishes to understand how such reasoning 
works. This is because the reliability of such reasoning often has little to do with how 
human perception works’ (Woodward [2011], p. 171). 
9 The so-called “space-clamp” problem consists in reliably inferring properties of the 
dendritic synapses and ion channels from electrophysiological recordings made from the 
soma of the neuron. 
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most of them can only be indirectly inferred. For many mechanisms, including the action 
potential, there are parts and activities behind the phenomena that can only be inferred 
from patterns of measurements obtained from sophisticated instruments. The 
identification process typically involves the usage of various experimental tools and 
methods, and the reliance on ampliative-abductive inference, which could justify 
knowledge claims about the unobservable parts and activities featuring in mechanistic 
explanation (Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2009]; Glennan [2005]; Machamer, Darden and 
Craver [2000]). 
 From an antirealist stance, this step is not a discovery process, but a modelling 
process, as understood in the previous section. The decomposition10 of a mechanism can 
be considered as an exercise, whereby the details of the mechanism are defined, instead 
of discovered, in terms of organized parts and activities. This modelling process relies on 
relevant background knowledge, well-established empirical results about the target 
mechanism, inferential methods connecting background knowledge to such results, and 
on practical ends and epistemic interests. Being an exercise in finding appropriate 
definitions, driven by pragmatic considerations, such modelling process will allow us to 
remain agnostic about the claims made by the resulting model about nature itself. Hence, 
even if the resulting model is empirically successful, makes successful predictions, and 
enables us to achieve other practical ends, we can still be justified in maintaining an 
attitude of epistemic prudence towards at least some of its claims. 
 For example, with respect to the parts of the action potential, while realist 
mechanists will identify the membrane of the axon, the sodium and potassium channels, 
sodium and potassium ions, ion pumps and so on, antirealist mechanists will define those 
parts over a modelling process. While the realist’s process of identification necessarily 
involves a reference to the extra-theoretical relation between the descriptions of parts and 
the world, the antirealist’s process of definition need not involve any direct reference to 
anything in the world. Nonetheless, antirealists can claim that their modelling process 
tallies, just like the realists’ process of discovery, with another core aspect of mechanistic 
explanation, viz.: mechanisms consist of parts. 
 Realist mechanists, to counter this antirealist reinterpretation, can say that the 
experiments undertaken by the scientists during the process of “decomposition” are 
actively intervening in the world and, thus, identifying via manipulation real causal 
relationships between variables and outcomes. These experimental interventions drive the 
realist’s mechanism-decomposition perspective, since the interventions are doing more 
than simply “defining” parts and operations. 
 Antirealists can rebut this objection by appealing to at least three types of 
considerations. First, active intervention and experimental manipulation alone are not 
sufficient to justify a realist attitude towards parts and operations of a mechanism. 
Manipulation does not occur in a theoretical vacuum. Even when manipulation occurs in 
a context such as Hodgkin and Huxley’s, where there are no firmly held beliefs about the 
parts and operations being manipulated in a mechanism, some kind of theory must be 
presupposed in claiming confidence in the correct functioning of the experimental 
apparatus and in characterising the results obtained. Manipulation may be ‘merely a step 
in the process of theorizing and experimentation that [can] eventually produce some 
                                                
10 We shall stick to this and related terms despite their realistic connotations. 
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degree of conviction. Hence, even within the context of scientific practice manipulation 
seems insufficient to bear the burden of a commitment to realism’ (Morrison [1990], p. 
13). 
 Second, scientists’ evaluation of whether an intervention has been successful or 
not often involves coherence considerations. Especially in cognitive neuroscience, “the 
degree to which the evidence produced through the intervention supports or coheres with 
what are regarded as plausible theories or models of the phenomenon” as well as with 
results produced by different instruments and methods (Bechtel [2008], p. 36-7; see also 
Bechtel [in press]; Hartmann [2001]). If coherence is generally not truth conducive, and 
coherence considerations loom large in scientists’ evaluation of the evidence produced by 
interventions, then there is reason to maintain that even successful interventions do not 
generally warrant a realist attitude. 
 Third, the perspective of Woodward’s ([2003]) account of manipulation and 
experimentation that informs much of the literature on mechanistic explanation, in 
particular Craver’s ([2007]) theory, can be described ‘as that of a modeler: pragmatic, 
piece-meal, and anti-foundational’ (Woodward [2008], p. 195). This is congenial to 
antirealist mechanists. Woodward’s ([2003]) primary focus is in fact not the metaphysics 
of causation, nor scientific realism. Rather, it is ‘methodological: how we think about, 
learn about, and reason with various causal notions and about their role in causal 
explanation’ (Ibid.). Woodward’s manipulationalism ‘requires only that there be facts of 
the matter […] about which counterfactual claims about the outcome of hypothetical 
experiments are true or false and about whether a correlation between C and E reflects a 
causal relationship between C and E or not’ (Woodward [2003], p. 121). This modest 
form of realism about causation, however, does not entail scientific realism. For it 
remains neutral about the conditions under which particular causal beliefs, formed 
through some experimental manipulation of a certain target mechanism, rest justified. 
 Realist mechanists may insist that merely defining the parts of a mechanism does 
not suffice for mechanistic explanation. The mechanistic account cannot do with just 
definitional posits towards which we cannot claim knowledge, because in this case the 
mechanistic account would provide us with no guide for individuating the conditions 
under which a mechanistic model explains. This argument is too quick, however. 
 According to the antirealist position on offer, parts can be understood as model 
entities so that the question about their ontic status is in fact irrelevant. Definitional posits 
are to be judged by their usefulness for various purposes, for example, in informing 
further experimentation, in clarifying notions that were previously ambiguous or obscure, 
in establishing links with other concepts, and so on. This position is informed by 
epistemic prudence and pragmatism so that the modelling process will be driven by 
knowledge of mechanisms’ phenomena and by the modeller’s pragmatic ends and 
interests. This does not imply that all mechanistic parts can be posited only if they are 
useful. Neither does it imply that we do not have any means besides predictive success to 
assess whether a mechanistic model delivers a good explanation. Both coherence and 
evidential considerations can in fact be brought to bear on our assessment of a 
mechanistic model. 
 The parts comprised by the mechanism of the action potential will always be 
defined against a background of relevant accepted knowledge with which they must 
cohere, as well as of relevant evidence, with which they must fit. This background 
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knowledge will be reflected in various modelling rules, which should be taken into 
consideration both in the definition of mechanistic parts and in the assessment of the 
resulting mechanistic model. A model that explains how ‘ions move across the membrane 
by […] a mechanism made of Swiss cheese’ will obviously not do (Craver [2006], p. 
370). But to use this type of Swiss cheese argument against the antirealist is misguided. 
For also the antirealist’s mechanistic model of the action potential will, as it should be, fit 
into the broader picture of the world. The justification of a model of the action potential 
should be in light of the degree of coherence of the model with established theories, other 
relevant models and accepted background knowledge and evidence (cf. Bechtel [in 
press]). This is why some of the posits in Hodgkin and Huxley’s model, such as their 
“activation particle,” were legitimate although they did not pick out any real feature of 
the target mechanism. While Hodgkin and Huxley were modelling the action potential, 
there were indeed a host of accepted results and theories about the build-up of the cell 
membrane, the behaviours of various ions, electrical currents, and so on, which informed 
and constrained their model. This case illustrates that, as mechanistic models are never 
defined in isolation, Swiss cheese-like mechanisms of the action potential will never see 
the light of the day, while Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the mechanism of the action 
potential did. 
 After the parts are defined, the next step is functional decomposition, in which the 
activities of the mechanism are defined. There are a number of modelling frameworks for 
defining the causal relationships comprised by a mechanism, including graphical models 
(causal diagrams) and structural equations models (see e.g. Jordan and Sejnowski [2001]; 
Pearl [2000]). In the case of the action potential, the operations to be modelled comprise 
the movement of ions through the axons membrane and the movement of an electrical 
charge down the axon. The antirealist will understand operations as model entities or 
events, constrained by certain modelling rules based on coherence-considerations, and 
informed by pragmatic ends. Antirealists can then claim that their modelling process 
tallies, just like the realists’ process of discovery, the fact that mechanisms consist of 
activities. 
 In sum, with respect to both structural and functional decomposition, mechanistic 
models can be provided by both realist and antirealist mechanists. Mechanistic parts and 
activities can be defined against a background of available knowledge. Pragmatic and 
coherence considerations will guide both the modelling process and the assessment of the 
resulting model. 
 Once the constitutive parts and activities of the mechanism are defined, 
localization is the next step. Localization is about ‘mapping […] operations onto […] 
parts’ (Wright and Bechtel [2007], p. 63). This should be interpreted as the attempt to 
synthesize the structural and functional decompositions of a mechanism. Structural and 
functional decompositions are partial and complementary in the sense that each draws on 
distinct properties of the other. Yet, in order to get to a comprehensive mechanism, the 
activities must be localized in specific parts. During the localization process, working 
parts are established. 
 In the action potential mechanism, ion channels (parts) open and close (activity) 
resulting in inward and outward fluxes (activity) of ions (parts) through the cell 
membrane at a specific location (part). As we described at the beginning of this section, 
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an electrical spike is thus generated (activity), and in an ongoing process, the spike 
travels swiftly down to the termination point of the axon (parts and activities). 
 Localization involves, according to current mechanisms literature, a realist 
commitment to believing that there exist organized components and activities that 
produce the behaviour of the mechanism in the process of being discovered (see e.g. 
Bechtel and Richardson [2010]). The antirealist, instead, sees both parts and activities as 
model entities defined over the course of the modelling process. No belief in the model’s 
claims about any particular feature of nature itself is required from this standpoint. We 
cannot map any activity onto just any part. But the specific defined build-up of the parts 
constrains the activities possibly performed by those parts, and in turn, as discussed 
above, the build-up of the parts and activities are constrained by coherence considerations 
and background knowledge. The antirealist has therefore a convincing story to tell also 
about localization. 
 Decomposition and localization frequently represent the most successful steps of 
mechanistic discovery, or mechanistic modelling. Nevertheless, current mechanists—
particularly Bill Bechtel—insist that those steps by themselves are not sufficient to 
warrant a successful mechanistic explanation (Bechtel [2011]; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
[2009]). A full mechanistic explanation requires a fourth step regarding the organization 
of the mechanism, called recomposition. This process underwrites that a mechanism is 
not just any aggregate of working parts lumped together, but an organized structure. In 
fact, it is only in virtue of the specifically organized interaction of working parts that the 
phenomenon comes about. Properly understood, organization is a precondition for the 
very possibility of interaction among the parts. Causality obviously plays an important 
role in organization, as it is the causal interaction between working parts that furnishes 
the foundation of organization. 
 The idea behind recomposition is intuitive from a realist point of view; we can 
only be sure of having fully explained and understood a mechanism once we are able to 
reconstruct it from its real parts and operations. But there is an equally convincing 
antirealist account of recomposition. On such an account, spatial and temporal 
relationships between model parts and activities should be defined such that the required 
output is generated.11 Causation, defined within an appropriate modelling framework that 
will provide us with rules of interaction between working parts, is crucial here. These 
rules of interaction underlying causation will bind the defined working parts together in 
such a way that they jointly and in an organized fashion produce what is relevant about 
the phenomenon. 
 In the case of the action potential, after relevant parts and activities have been 
defined over the course of mechanistic modelling, we should temporally and spatially 
relate them so that they display the specific organization of opening and closing ion 
channels that plays a key role in the firing of the neurons. As noted above, one 
                                                
11 Bechtel’s emphasis in his work on recomposition is on how computational modelling is 
integral to this process. His description of the computer modelling enterprise fits an 
antirealist stance nicely (cf. e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2010]; Bechtel [2008], pp. 
246-8 on the relationship between modelling, computer simulations, and the action 
potential mechanism). We are grateful to an anonymous referee to draw our attention to 
this point. 
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framework whereby we can specify such types of organizational relationships is Pearl’s 
([2000]) framework. Within this framework, we can define spatial and temporal 
organizational of a mechanism by using a causal network. This is a graph comprising 
nodes, which may correspond to components of the mechanism under considerations, and 
edges, which may correspond to organizational features of the mechanism, whose 
behaviour is governed by a set of structural equations. The point that bears emphasis here 
is that such type of causal modelling allows us to define the organizational features that 
are partly responsible for the phenomena produced by the mechanism (see also Halpern 
and Pearl [2005]). Such modelling tools are congenial to an antirealist account of the 
recomposition process. By drawing upon them, the antirealist mechanist can show how 
the phenomenon produced by some mechanism depends on its organized parts and 
operations, which are defined over a modelling process. Thereby, the antirealist can 
successfully carry out mechanistic recomposition without adopting any realist stance. 
 
 
5. Some Outstanding Issues for the Antirealist Mechanist 
The above discussion suggests that an antirealist approach to mechanistic explanations is 
tenable since all core aspects of the mechanistic account are underwritten also from an 
antirealist’s standpoint. It should be clear that our aim in the sections above was to 
provide a plausible antirealist reconstruction, which could fit scientific practice, so as to 
show that the mechanistic account of scientific explanation is independent of scientific 
realism. Our aim was not to argue for a full-fledged account of explanation, or to argue 
against scientific realism. We take it that our contribution will challenge realist 
mechanists to tell us what exactly the payoff of realism is with respect to mechanistic 
explanation; it will also serve antirealist mechanists as a starting point to develop a more 
detailed account of mechanistic explanation. 
 This section provides additional considerations and details to articulate the 
proposal that we have been advancing in the previous sections, by beginning to address 
three outstanding issues. The first question concerns the relationship between modelling 
and explanation. It asks how is it that a mechanistic model that results from an antirealist 
modelling process of the sort described above successfully explains the phenomenon in 
question? 
 As pointed out in Section 2, an important difference between current mechanistic 
accounts is the one between epistemic and ontic views of explanation. Although the ontic 
view is arguably in tension with an antirealist approach to mechanistic explanation, such 
a view is not essential to the mechanistic account (Wright [2012]). On most accounts, to 
successfully explain a phenomenon is to provide some description of how a certain 
mechanism produces that phenomenon. In Machamer, Darden and Craver’s ([2000], p. 3) 
words: ‘To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that 
phenomenon, i.e., to explain how it was produced’ (emphasis added). As a description, 
the explanation will be a representation of the mechanism, rather than the mechanism 
itself. So, insofar as models provide descriptions of their targets, given an explanandum 
phenomenon, to provide a model of the mechanism for that phenomenon is thereby to 
explain that phenomenon. To provide a mechanistic model, it should now be clear, does 
not force upon us any realist attitude. We need not believe that an explanatory 
mechanistic model is a true description of nature itself. 
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 The second question concerns our view of coherence and asks: How is the 
internal consistency of a proposed mechanism guaranteed? Under what conditions is 
coherence with background knowledge warranted? 
 Internal consistency and coherence with background knowledge emerge during 
the iterative process of defining (i.e. modelling) the mechanism. To begin with, the 
mechanistic parts and operations are defined, independently of each other, in such a way 
that the parts structurally, and the activities functionally, build up the mechanism; but 
they are also defined in such a way that these parts and activities comply with relevant 
background knowledge. Then the parts and activities are wedded into working parts, 
respecting the constraints that the build-up and characteristics of the parts put on the 
possibility to perform certain activities. In this wedding process it might turn out that the 
fit between parts and activities is not sufficiently good. In this case, the first step of the 
modelling process is reiterated. 
 Next, the working parts are organized into an interconnected and interacting 
structure, respecting the constraints put on this structure by causality rules, so that the 
explanandum phenomenon is produced. It might be that, given the available working 
parts and activities in the model, we are not able to spelling out the right organizational 
features of the mechanism under consideration. In this case, the previous steps of the 
modelling process should be repeated. 
 This iterative process guarantees that a consistent structure will emerge and that 
the resulting mechanistic model is consistent. When the development process is iterated, 
the model is constantly being adjusted and, possibly, detailed. This process of adjusting is 
basically a process of putting ever more severe constraints on the model. It is a process of 
putting constraints on the build-up of the parts, activities, on the way certain parts can 
perform certain activities, and on the way working parts interact, and hence on the causal 
organization of the mechanism as a whole. 
 Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the action potential illustrates this point well. 
This model is constrained by knowledge about (i) the ways in which an action potential 
can be initiated (e.g. through depolarizations in the axon hillock), (ii) the ways in which it 
can be stopped (e.g. by blocking the flow of sodium ions through ion channels by 
applying tetrodotoxin to the process), and (iii) the build-up of the parts (e.g. the 
maximum numbers of channels in the membrane or the maximum and minimum 
concentration of ions). The modelling process was constrained by the available data, and 
embedded the resulting mechanism into a larger body of accepted background 
knowledge. Although incomplete and non-committal on the reality of at least some of the 
components and activities that it included, Hodgkin-Huxley types of models are at least 
still useful and popular for understanding ion channels interactions. 
 Finally, in which sense is the claim that an antirealist account of mechanistic 
explanation fits scientific practice warranted? 
 Recall that one attractive feature of the mechanistic account is that it fits practice 
in the special sciences in a way that the covering law or unificationist models fail to do. 
Life scientists, for example, do not typically explain a phenomenon by subsuming it 
under some law. Rather, their explanations typically involve the specification of a 
mechanism. Such mechanistic explanations are developed by starting from a 
characterization of the phenomenon to be explained; the explanatory process proceeds by 
functionally and structurally identifying components and activities comprised by the 
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mechanism producing the phenomenon; ultimately, a successful explanation provided by 
the scientist specifies how the organized behaviour of such components and activities 
produces the explanandum phenomenon. 
 The previous section showed that an antirealist reconstruction of mechanistic 
explanation seats well with such practice. Moreover, as pragmatic and coherence 
considerations are the driving forces of the antirealist’s modelling process, our proposal 
is congenial to understanding many historical cases and current scientific practice, where 
pragmatic ends and coherence are essential to theoretical advancement and model choice. 
Therefore, salient features of scientific practice do not force upon the mechanistic 
account scientific realism. Antirealism is at least an equally viable option. 
 
 
6. Two Problems for the Realist Mechanist 
Thus far we have argued that mechanistic explanation does not require a commitment 
with scientific realism. Specifically, it does not require an “optimistic epistemic” stance 
towards mechanistic explanations. This section provides some prima facie grounds for 
why it can be preferable for the mechanist to adopt an antirealist stance, instead of a 
realist one. We shall discuss two problems that the realist mechanist faces, which can be 
more easily avoided by the antirealist. These are the identification problem and the type-
token problem. 
 Let us begin with the identification problem. On the mechanistic account, both in 
its realist and antirealist guise, explaining a phenomenon depends on identifying the 
mechanism for that phenomenon. Apart from telling us that mechanisms are identified by 
the parts and activities that constitute them, most of the current philosophical accounts of 
mechanisms do not provide precise answers to the questions of where one mechanism 
ends and another begins and how a mechanism is to be set apart from its environment 
(acknowledging this fact, Craver [2009] discusses this issue while he provides an 
assessment of the relationship between mechanisms and natural kinds). For instance, 
some of the ions constituting the mechanism of the action potential are inside the 
membrane, others are outside. Action potentials, moreover, have long-lasting effects, for 
instance on blood oxygenation, which are typically not included in the mechanism. How 
do we tell, then, where and when the mechanism of the action potential begins and 
another, different mechanism begins? 
 For a realist, the spatial and temporal boundaries between a mechanism and its 
environment are real, extra-theoretical, boundaries. For a realist, there is a fact of the 
matter about where and when the mechanism of the action potential begins and where 
and when it ends. Thus, from this perspective, it is not enough to apply certain pragmatic 
criteria to a description of a part of the world and carve out a certain mechanism 
according to our explanatory interests and needs. 
 This approach suits our antirealism; but it would be problematic if one’s 
mechanistic account presupposes some form of realism. The realist might address this 
difficulty by emphasizing the causal-organizational aspect of a mechanism. Mechanisms 
are causal structures, and a proper causal characterization of them can enable us to 
reliably carve out distinct mechanisms from the total causal structure of the world. By 
drawing on Simon ([1962]) and Wimsatt ([1972]), for example, the realist mechanist can 
identify the boundaries of mechanisms based on the strength of the causal relations 
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within a putative mechanism, and between the putative mechanism and the outside 
environment. The idea is that the strength of the causal relations between the mechanism 
and the environment are not as abundant and tenacious as the relations among 
mechanistic components. 
 This proposal has two problems, however. First, it does not fit ‘our scientifically 
informed intuitions about the boundaries of many mechanisms’ (Craver [2009], p. 590). 
As Craver ([2009], p. 590) acknowledges, the causal relations between the mechanism of 
the action potential and some of the factors that are typically treated as outside its 
boundaries ‘are as strong as any of the causal ties among mechanism’s components.’ 
Second, and more importantly, identifying a mechanism’s boundaries based on the 
strength of its causal relations makes the identification problem shift from the 
identification of the mechanism o the identification of the (strength of the) causal 
relations. So the question now becomes how causal relations are identified. 
 The realist might reply that our best theories of causation can help us to answer 
this question. The realist might appeal to Woodward’s ([2003]) manipulationist 
counterfactual approach, to which—as we saw above—accounts of mechanistic 
explanation such as Craver’s ([2007]) appeal. Here causal relations are seen as relations 
between two variable-types (c and e)—where, roughly, manipulations of the value of c 
result in a change in the value of e, and if the value of c is not manipulated, then the value 
of e does not undergo any change. Still the identification problem remains. It is not clear 
how variables (c and e), which should refer to real parts and operations in the world, 
should be identified independently of our interests and epistemic goals (Strevens [2007], 
[2008] touch upon this sort of identification problem in relation to Woodward’s 
manipulationist theory of causation). Thus, we are back at the initial problem of how to 
identify a mechanism’s parts and activities independently of our interests and epistemic 
goals. 
 Hence, there is reason to conclude that realist mechanists, who try to identify 
mechanisms’ joints in nature, face an important challenge. They should be able to carve 
up the world into specific entities, viz. mechanisms, in order to identify mechanisms with 
real organized parts and activities. But there seems to be no purely ontic arbitrator that 
could serve them to cut the world at its mechanistic joints. Consequently, the foundations 
of the mechanistic account developed from a realist perspective seem to rest on 
problematic grounds.12 
 It may well be that the mechanistic structure of the world depends, at least in part, 
on our explanatory interests and pragmatic considerations. Also Craver acknowledges 
that ‘the boundaries of a mechanism depend on our choice of the explanandum 
phenomenon […] and on the way that we choose to describe that phenomenon’ (Craver 
[2009], p. 591; see also Machamer, Darden and Craver [2000], pp. 11-2 on the role of 
‘idealization’ in specifying a mechanism’s ‘start and finish conditions’). If this is so, then 
                                                
12 It is possible that a realist could be a conventionalist about mechanism boundaries 
while still believing that terms standing for parts and activities must refer, picking out 
real parts and activities in the world independently of our pragmatic and epistemic 
interests. We do not deny this possibility. Our point is that, in the face of a more natural 
solution to the problem of identification put forward by the antirealist, the realist should 
tell us what her extra-commitments would buy us. 
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the identification problem will not arise for the antirealist mechanist. For her, it will be 
sufficient to rely on methodological and pragmatic selection criteria, which provide 
goods grounds for the identification of the mechanism as well as its parts and operations. 
 Let us now turn to the type-token problem. From a realist perspective, 
mechanisms should be understood as things, which occupy unique space-time points (cf. 
Glennan [2002], p. S345). A mechanism, that is, is a concrete entity, a particular or a 
token. If this is so, then an important feature of our world is that it often contains many 
tokens of a single type of mechanism; it contains, for example, many tokens of the 
mechanism for the action potential. Scientists are generally interested in types of 
mechanisms, and it is types of mechanisms that feature prominently in scientific 
explanation. Machamer, Darden and Craver note this fact by quoting Wimsatt: ‘At least 
in biology, most scientists see their work as explaining types of phenomena by 
discovering mechanisms’ (Wimsatt [1972], p. 67; cited by Machamer, Darden and Craver 
[2000], p. 34). 
 Now, from the realist’s standpoint, if the world contains many tokens of the same 
type of mechanism, then there must be some sort of regularity (or fact of the matter) in 
the world in virtue of which those tokens are of the same type of mechanism. Different 
regularities would thus warrant the inference that if a particular phenomenon has already 
been produced many times and reliably by a particular (token) mechanism, then a similar 
phenomenon will be produced by a similar (token) mechanism. Furthermore, these 
regularities in the structure of the world would make intelligible the appeal to types of 
mechanisms in scientific explanation. For such an appeal would exactly pick out some 
natural regularity. 
 However, if the realist mechanist has to rely on natural regularities to account for 
the fact that there are many mechanisms of the same type in the world, then two troubles 
would arise for her. First, many particular mechanisms behave too stochastically, 
unreliably or are too fragile for underwriting the claim that their operations instantiate 
natural regularities. As noted by Bogen ([2005], p. 400), ‘the mechanisms which initiate 
electrical activity in post-synaptic neurons by releasing neurotransmitters are a case in 
point: […] each one fails more often than it succeeds, and so far, no one has found 
differences among background conditions which account for this.’ To insist that in spite 
of such unreliability, stochasticity and fragility displayed by many mechanisms, which 
scientists would surely consider of the same type, there must be underlying regularities, 
and that tokens of the same type of mechanism ‘must operate in accordance with them 
[…] is an article of faith,” which does not have enough empirical support’ (Ibid.). 
 Second, even if we assume that the evidence justifies the generic claim that the 
operations of many token mechanisms instantiate some natural regularities corresponding 
to true generalizations, the realist mechanist still faces an important challenge. She should 
be able to tell us more about which natural regularities among certain token-mechanisms 
enable us to justifiably induce that those particular mechanisms are of the same type. This 
is not a trivial challenge. 
 The same neuron, for instance, can produce action potentials with different 
shapes, varying heights and widths, whose underlying particular mechanisms comprise 
ionic conductances with varying biophysical properties. Furthermore, different neurons 
may have different voltage sensitivity and different temporal dynamics. In short, “all 
spikes are not alike” (Bean [2007]; Nusser [2009]). Even if there is some regularity 
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among token mechanisms for the action potential, there also is a lot of variance. Thus, 
picking out the “right” regularities in order to warrant the induction from tokens to types 
will involve a trade-off between generality and precision considerations. If many varying 
details are considered so as to take account of potentially important distinctions among 
particular mechanisms, then the induced type might fail to reveal some potentially 
significant regularity. Vice versa, if too many varying details among token mechanisms 
are discarded, then the induced type might fail to reveal potentially significant 
differences. Hence, ‘whether two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same kind depends 
upon which grain of abstraction one chooses to describe them. If there is no objectively 
appropriate degree of abstraction for typing mechanisms, then judgments about whether 
two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same kind rely ineliminably on judgments by 
people (in concert) about the appropriate degree of abstraction required for the problem at 
hand’ (Craver [2009], p. 589). Therefore, as a mechanist antirealist would claim, there is 
probably no fact of the matter about natural regularities, independent of our background 
knowledge, interests and methodological decisions, that warrants the induction from 
token-mechanisms to types.13 
 In sum, if all or even most token mechanisms do not operate regularly, then the 
justification of the inductive inferences from properties of token-mechanisms to 
properties of a type cannot rely on some fact of the matter in nature as a realist may 
claim. Furthermore, in lack of such natural regularities, scientists’ appeal to types of 
mechanisms in their explanations would be hard to understand from a realist standpoint. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The growing literature on mechanistic explanation represents one of the major success 
stories in recent philosophy of science. In this paper, we showed that the realist 
background that seems to be generally presupposed within such literature can be replaced 
by an antirealist background, preserving the core features of the mechanistic account. In 
particular, the antirealist mechanist as well as the realist can make sense of the 
explanatory practice in special sciences such as neuroscience. What is more, we have 
provided some grounds to maintain that an antirealist background might be preferable to 
the realist one, as it avoids more easily some of the methodological and epistemological 
problems the realist faces. 
 Our project invites several follow-ups. First, it would be interesting to examine 
other case studies, in light of which to evaluate the different merits of the realist and 
antirealist backgrounds. For example, Lindley Darden’s extensive work on protein 
synthesis (Darden [2006]), which has generated little debate in comparison to the action 
potential, may be another good test-case to assess our claim that good mechanistic 
explanations do not require a commitment to scientific realism. Second, an antirealist 
mechanistic account would need further development. For the aims of this paper, our 
                                                
13 Realists may have answers also to this problem. For example, they may claim that one 
could be a realist about token-mechanisms, while allowing that classification of 
mechanisms into types involves various pragmatic considerations. The challenge, 
however, remains the same: Why should we make extra commitments, in the face of a 
plausible antirealist solution that fits scientific practice? 
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approach has been minimal: it has been informed just by pragmatism and some type of 
epistemic prudence motivated by general considerations about the history of science and 
scientific practice. But one may want to build on it to add more details. One may want to 
know more about the relationship between how-actually models, mechanistic explanation 
and confirmation, which seems to be well set in an antirealist context, and, more 
generally, about the prospects of an antirealist account of explanation. 
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